Your AI wrote the code. Athena makes sure it's safe.
Athena is one autonomous AI security engineer for your code. Tell it what you want — "scan my repo," "am I SOC2 ready," "secure my app" — and it plans the work, runs the right scanners, triages findings in context, and proposes fixes. A whole security team, in one brain.
No credit cardWorks with Cursor, Claude Code, Lovable, Bolt
The problem
AI writes code fast. Security doesn't care.
91.5% of vibe-coded apps ship with at least one critical vulnerability
Based on a 2024 analysis of public AI-assisted projects on GitHub. Most introduce auth bugs, exposed secrets, or injection vectors within the first 100 commits.
AI coding tools optimize for working code, not secure code
LLM-generated code passes tests but rarely passes threat models. Models will happily write eval(req.body) if it makes the demo run.
You didn't write it, so you don't know what to audit
The classic vibe-coder bind: 50,000 lines of generated code, no mental model of any of them. Manual review is a non-starter.
How it works
One brain. A whole security team.
Athena runs like a security company: it scopes the work as a CISO, then delegates to specialist departments — AppSec, Red Team, Incident Response, Threat Intel, and GRC — each commanding real scanners. You talk to one engineer; a team does the work.
The product
Built for how you already ship.
Findings land where you live — in your dashboard, your PRs, your editor. Nothing new to learn.
app.secureos.dev/repos/my-saas-app
my-saas-app · Overview
main · 2 min ago
Files scanned
847
Critical
2
High
4
Medium
6
Active agents
Sentinel
scanning · 32/47 files
PR #214
Auditor
watching 142 dependencies
live
Penetrator
last run: 4h ago · 0 issues
scheduled
Compliance Officer
SOC2 · 87% complete
5 items left
Findings · 12 open
filter: severity ↓
Severity
Finding
Location
Agent
Age
CRITICAL
SQL injection via string concat
db.py:34
Sentinel
2m
CRITICAL
Hardcoded API key
auth.js:12
Sentinel
2m
HIGH
CORS wildcard origin
config.js:8
Sentinel
2m
HIGH
Missing rate limit on /invite
invite.ts:8
Sentinel
4m
HIGH
JWT signed with weak secret
jwt.ts:24
Sentinel
1h
HIGH
Outdated lodash with prototype pollution CVE
package.json
Auditor
3h
MEDIUM
Debug mode enabled in production
app.py:156
Sentinel
2m
MEDIUM
HTTPS not enforced on /healthz
server.ts:42
Penetrator
6h
MEDIUM
Stack trace exposed on 500 errors
middleware.ts:18
Penetrator
6h
Agents · 4 active
manage subscriptions →
Sentinel
35 rules · scanning
Auditor
142 deps · 24/7
Penetrator
last: 4h ago
Compliance Officer
SOC2 · 87%
Scout
PRO · paused
Architect
PRO · paused
Launcher
PRO · waiting on launch
Incident Responder
TEAM · paused
Scans · last 24 hours
12 runs · 0 failures
Time
Trigger
Files
Findings
Duration
2 min ago
push · main · a4f2c9a
47
4 new
1.2s
4 min ago
PR #214 · feat: invite endpoint
47
2 new
0.9s
1 h ago
push · feat-jwt · b7d12c1
52
0 new
1.4s
3 h ago
scheduled · Auditor
—
1 new CVE
3.1s
6 h ago
scheduled · Penetrator
—
2 medium
82s
12 h ago
push · main · 1e9a4b2
46
0 new
1.1s
Compliance · my-saas-app
Compliance Officer · TEAM
SOC 2 Type I
87%
GDPR
72%
HIPAA
43%
PCI-DSS
91%
Open items · SOC 2
Encryption at rest verified for production DB
missing
Quarterly access review documented
missing
Incident response runbook published
draft
Background checks for new hires
draft
Vendor SOC 2 reports collected
missing
github.com/acme/my-saas-app/pull/214
Open
feat: add user invite endpoint
#214 · opened 4 minutes ago by @vibemaster
secureos-sentinel commented on this pull request
just now
CRITICALsrc/api/invite.ts:23
SQL injection via string interpolation
21 const userId = req.body.userId;
- 22 const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;+ 22 const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1`;+ 23 const result = await db.query(query, [userId]); 24
Why this matters: User input flows directly into the SQL string. An attacker could send ' OR 1=1; -- and read every row.
Sentinel scan · 47 files · 1.2s · click Apply on each finding
2 open
app.secureos.dev/findings/SECOS-2191
CRITICALSECOS-2191 · CWE-89
SQL injection via string interpolation in user invite handler
The userId value from the request body is interpolated directly into a SQL string before being sent to PostgreSQL. Because it never passes through the parameter-binding API, any character the user types is treated as SQL syntax.
Why Educator flagged this
This is one of the most common patterns AI coding tools produce: a template-literal query that "just works" against a local dev database. In production it lets an attacker dump your entire users table by sending ' OR 1=1; -- as the userId.
Recommended fix
- const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;- const result = await db.query(query);+ const result = await db.query(+ 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1',+ [userId]+ );
The first 20 people to sign up get a permanent Founding Member badge and access to PR Review — the $29/mo Pro feature that posts security findings as inline GitHub comments — free on any plan, forever. No upgrade required. No expiry.
Sentinel found a hardcoded Stripe key in my repo before my first paying customer did. I had pushed it 11 minutes earlier. I bought Pro the same day.
MR
Maya R.
Solo founder, ledgerly.app
Cursor
"
I vibe-coded an entire SaaS in three weekends. SecureOS caught 14 things I'd never have noticed — including a CORS wildcard that would have been a very bad Monday.
DK
Devon K.
Founder, threadly.io
Claude Code
"
Auditor pinged me at 2am about a compromised npm package the day after I added it. I've never bought enterprise security tooling that fast or that quiet.
' OR 1=1; --and read every row.